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There exists a unique equilibrium: individuals who invest in protection choose to interact more relative to those
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Individuals in isolated communities exhibit different behavior: the High community has a higher rate of protec-
tion and interaction, and a lower rate of infection. Integration ampliﬁes these differences.
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Interactions between individuals generate value, but facilitate the
spread of infections. This tension is salient in diseases such as inﬂuenza,
HIV and tuberculosis, but also applies to the Internet and other digital
networks.1 In all these examples, infection spreads primarily through
interpersonal contacts: so prevalence can be reduced by restricting in-
teraction and/or by investing in protection. This paper develops a
model that examines the trade-off between these two courses of action
and its consequences for the spread of infections.anonymous referees for com-
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relevance of our analysis for cy-In ourmodel, a population faces the risk of becoming infected. Every
individual chooses howmuch to interact with others in the population,
and whether or not to protect himself. Interactions generate beneﬁts
but increase the risk of infection from infected others. Protection is
available, at a ﬁxed cost. The protection rate, the proﬁle of interaction,
and the contagiousness of the infection together determine the extent
of the disease in the population.
We ﬁrst establish that a (Nash) equilibrium exists and is unique. For
a broad class of circumstances, equilibriumprotection rates are interior:
only a part of the population protects. Individuals who invest in protec-
tion interact more than those who do not. Restricted interaction and
protection are substitutes. This relation is consistent with empirical ob-
servation. For example, in their well known study on British sexual atti-
tudes and behavior, Wellings et al. (1994) report a positive correlation
between the frequency of new partners and the use of condoms.
The contagiousness determines the probability of becoming infected
from interactingwith infected individuals, and is a key parameter in the
study of epidemics.2 We ﬁnd that equilibrium response to contagious-
ness is non-monotonic. There exists a threshold level of contagiousness:
below this value, protection rates are zero, and the response to higher
contagiousness is through reduced interaction only. This threshold re-
ﬂects theﬁxed costs associatedwith protection: below the threshold in-
curring the costs is not worthwhile. Above the threshold, returns from
protection outweigh costs. Greater contagiousness now induces greater2 For a classical exposition of the theory of epidemiology, seeAnderson andMay (1991).
For a recent survey on epidemics, see Gersovitz (2011).
4 The experiencewith swineﬂu vaccines isworthmentioning in this regard.Most OECD
countries have large stocks of swine ﬂu vaccines; for instance, in England, the NHS stock is
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interaction. Infection rates too may vary non-monotonically – initially
increasing and then declining – in contagiousness.
In our basic model individuals are homogenous. We then turn to
a society with two communities that differ in their returns from
interaction — High and Low. Individuals in isolated communities
exhibit different behavior: the High community has a higher rate
of protection and interaction. As communities integrate, protection
and interaction further increase in the High community while they
fall in the Low community. Integration thus leads to falling (rising)
infection in the High (Low) community.
The theoretical prediction on the relation between returns and equi-
librium behavior is broadly consistent with empirical observation.
Wellings et al. (1994) report that single people have more partners
and are much more likely to use condoms as compared to cohabiting
couples. Philipson and Posner (1993) report a negative correlation be-
tween education/income and HIV infection: they surmise that higher
income raises the returns from the future and thereby leads to greater
investments in protection (the use of condoms). This in turn lowers
the rate of infection.
Our model and its predictions are also related to cybersecurity.3 The
equilibrium property of positive correlation between protection and in-
teraction is consistent with the ﬁndings of Anderson et al. (2007) and
Moore et al. (2011) on the positive relation between investments in se-
curity and Internet use. The model predicts that the High community
will have higher protection and interaction: this is consistent with the
fact that larger ﬁrms are more active in securing themselves as com-
pared to smaller ﬁrms (Anderson et al., 2007).
Our paper is a contribution to the economic study of epidemics and
cybersecurity. It is useful to separate the existing research in economic
epidemiology into two strands. The ﬁrst strand of work takes interac-
tion as given and explores the response in protection rates. This work
includes Brito et al. (1991), Geoffard and Philipson (1996, 1997),
Francis (1997), Goldman and Lightwood (2002), Gersovitz and
Hammer (2004), Galeotti and Rogers (2013), and Chen and Toxvaerd
(2014). A second (and complementary) group of papers assumes that
protection is absent and studies the response in interaction. This work
includes Philipson and Posner (1993) and Kremer (1996). To the best
of our knowledge, the present paper is theﬁrst attempt to provide a uni-
ﬁed treatment of interaction and protection. The analysis yields a num-
ber of new insights;we highlight two of themvia a comparisonwith the
benchmark models.
Compared to the ‘pure protection’ benchmark, our model yields
lower rates of protection. This is because part of the population foregoes
protection and responds instead by adapting interaction. But compared
to that benchmark, infection rates are higher in our model. This tells us
that differences in protection are ‘insufﬁciently’ compensated for by re-
stricted interaction.
Consider next the ‘pure interaction’ benchmark, where protection is
unavailable. The more a susceptible interacts, the greater the chances
that he becomes infected and, in turn, transmits the disease to others
around him. ‘Pure interaction’ models are thus characterized by the
property that increasing returns from interaction raises infection
(Kremer, 1996). In our setting, on the other hand, the more individuals
value interaction the less inclined they are to respond to an epidemic by
reducing interaction. This implies that higher returns from interaction
lead to higher protection rates and – in sharp contrast to the ‘pure inter-
action’ benchmark – to lower infection.3 Estimates of the costs of cyber crime vary greatly. A recent study estimates the costs to
be in the range of 300 billion USD to 1 trillion USD; this is between 0.4 % and 1.4 % of global
GDP. A recent study for the UK Cabinet Ofﬁce reported that the cost to the UK economy is
over 27 billion USD per annum (Detica and Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2011). In 2009, roughly 10mil-
lion computers were infected with malware designed to steal online credentials. The an-
nual damages caused by malware is of the order of 9.3 billion Euros in Europe, while in
the US the annual costs of identity theft are estimated at 2.8 billion USD Moore et al.
(2011).Our results have potential policy implications. A ﬁrst order implica-
tion is that demand for protectionwill be lower in amodel where inter-
action levels are a choice variable.4 An important insight from the
economic models of epidemiology is the externality in individual pro-
tection. In our model, choosing protection creates an additional exter-
nality: protected individuals interact more and this alters the pool of
contacts. We show that this expands the scope for policy intervention,
as compared to the ‘pure protection’ benchmark. Finally, our work sug-
gests that subsidies on protection should target those valuing social in-
teraction least, as doing so minimizes crowding-out effects.
The problem of computer network security has been extensively
studied in electrical engineering and computer science; for an overview
of this work see Alpcan and Basar (2011) and Anderson (2008). Aspnes
et al. (2006) (and the literature that follows them) study protection
choices by nodes faced with a viral infection that spreads through a
given network. Our paper contributes to this literature by proposing a
general framework in which interaction (network) and security invest-
ments are both endogenous.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is pre-
sented in Section 2, and analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 studies hetero-
geneity. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are presented in the online-
appendix.
2. Model
The basic model has the following features. A continuum of individ-
uals live for two periods. Each period, the agents individually decide
howmuch social interaction to have (in a bar say, or in on-line activity).
Social interaction is beneﬁcial, but has drawbacks: interaction in the
ﬁrst period raises chances of a contagious infection, which reduces pay-
offs in the second period. To mitigate the chances of infection, each
agent faces two options. He may reduce interaction in the ﬁrst period,
or invest in protection. The protection rate, the proﬁle of interaction,
and the contagiousness together determine the fraction of the popula-
tion who become infected. We next lay out the details and notation of
this model.
2.1. Social interaction
A typical agent is labeled i. We let kit ≥ 0 denote the socialization
‘effort’ of agent i in period t= 1, 2: each period, i selects kit individuals
uniformly at random from the pool of available contacts.5 We borrow
this interpretation from Kremer (1996).6 Given an arbitrary subset A
of individuals, the probability that a new contact of i is with an individ-
ual in A is
ℙt select contact in Að Þ ¼
Z
j∈A
k jtdjZ
j∈ 0;1½ 
kjtdj:
ð1Þ
2.2. Infection
There are two ways to become infected. An individual may become
infected exogenously, with probability ϵ N 0. Or an individual mayestimated to have around40million vaccines in stock. This large stock of vaccines has pro-
voked much discussion in recent years. Our theoretical result points to one relatively un-
explored reason for this large stock: lowered international travel and interaction in
response to public measures on quarantine and the fears of epidemic.
5 The assumption on uniform selection is relaxed in Section 4, when considering heter-
ogenous populations. There, we allow for ‘search’ to be directed.
6 As in Kremer (1996), we abstract from strategic complementarity in social interac-
tions. Making strategic complementarities more explicit and signiﬁcant would introduce
the possibility of multiple equilibria. While this would enrich the analysis, our thought is
that the key trade-offs we identify would remain important in this richer framework.
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of the disease, i.e. the probability of contracting the disease from
interacting with an infected individual.
It is useful to deﬁne the incidence qit facing agent i in period t, indi-
cating the probability that a newmeeting of i iswith an infected individ-
ual. The total probability that (unprotected) individual i becomes
infected during period t is then
pit ¼ ϵ þ 1−ϵð Þ 1− 1−αqitð Þkit
 
: ð2Þ
Throughout, we assume thatα is small so that pit is well approximat-
ed by
pit ¼ ϵ þ 1−ϵð Þαqitkit : ð3Þ
2.3. Protection
Each individual faces the option to invest in protection, for a cost
γ N 0.7 The cost may be ﬁnancial (as in the purchase of a condom, a vac-
cine or a computer security software) or reﬂect direct disutility (as in
the case of condoms, or possible side-effects in the case of a vaccine).
The binary variable vit records the protection status of individual i in pe-
riod t: vit = 1 if individual i protects, and vit = 0 otherwise. Protection
perfectly immunizes an individual, so pit = 0 if vit = 1.8 We will say
that an individual is unprotected or susceptible if vit=0. The protection
rateVt denotes the fraction of the population investing in protection.We
let It denote the infection rate, i.e. the fraction of individuals who be-
come infected during period t:
It :¼
Z
i∈ 0;1½ 
1−vitð Þpitdi: ð4Þ
2.4. Returns from interaction
We let ri(kit)≥ 0 denote the returns from interaction for individual i
interacting according to kit during period t. These are deﬁned by
ri kitð Þ :¼ θig kitð Þ; ð5Þ
where θi denotes the type of individual i, and g is a twice continuously
differentiable strictly concave function maximized at kN0. Higher θi
may reﬂect greater returns from interaction due to differences in
human, physical or ﬁnancial capital. A population is (ex ante) homoge-
nous if all individuals have the same type, i.e. θi = θ for all i, and heter-
ogenous otherwise. Section 3 studies homogenous populations;
Section 4 takes up the case of heterogenous populations.
2.5. Timing
The timing of the game is as follows. Each agent decides, when a pe-
riod begins, whether or not to invest in protection and howmuch to in-
teract during that period. During period t, unprotected agents become
infected according to Eq. (3). An agent who becomes infected during7 We have opted for a simple formulation of protection: the costs are invariant with re-
spect to levels of interaction. This is a good model for a vaccine and for computer security
software, but appears to be inappropriate for condoms where protection costs vary with
frequency of interaction. We note that our main results continue to hold with variable
costs of protection so long as the choice for protection is made ex-ante and applies to all
interactions.
8 We assume that protection is perfect, i.e. an individualwho invests in protection never
contracts the disease. We note that (i) this assumption is justiﬁed if the probability of be-
coming infected is sufﬁciently reduced by protection and (ii) our results are unchanged if
there is a small probability of getting the disease from the vaccine itself.period t ‘dies’ when the period ends. The game ends after period 2,
where all agents die.
2.6. Strategies and payoffs
A strategy for individual i determines protection and interaction in
each period before death. We assume that agents maximize expected
lifetime returns from interaction, net of protection costs.9
2.7. Equilibrium
The structure of the game as well as the distribution of types in the
population are common knowledge. The model deﬁnes a game of com-
plete information between individuals. We study the Nash equilibria of
this game.
3. Analysis
This section presents our analysis of the choice of adaptive interac-
tion and protection and its implications for infection in homogenous
populations. We establish existence of a unique equilibrium, and com-
pare its properties with those obtained in ‘pure interaction’ models on
the one hand and ‘pure protection’ models on the other. We explore
the effects of varying the contagiousness of the disease, and the returns
from interaction.
We begin with some preliminary observations on the framework
deﬁned earlier allowing us to simplify the formal analysis of our
model. Since all agents die when the ﬁnal period ends, they need not
be concerned about infection during that period. This yields vi2 = 0
andki2 ¼ k, for all i, in any equilibrium. An unprotected individual i's ex-
pected payoff may thus be simpliﬁed to
Πi ki1; vi1 ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ ri ki1ð Þ þ 1−pi1ð Þri k
 
; ð6Þ
with pi1 given by Eq. (3): interacting according to ki1 in period 1 confers
returns ri(ki1) during that period, but also reduces chances of a payoff in
the period which follows.
Observe similarly that a protected individual i's expected payoff
must in any equilibrium be given by
Πi vi1 ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ 2ri k
 
−γ: ð7Þ
Eqs. (6) and (7) allow us to reduce the initial setup to an equivalent
but simpler one-shot game, and to focus exclusively on ﬁrst-period var-
iables. Henceforth time subscripts will be dropped, under the conven-
tion that a variable without a time subscript always refers to the ﬁrst
period. We will say that an equilibrium is interior if the protection
rate V lies in the open interval (0, 1).
Our ﬁrst result establishes existence and uniqueness of an equilibri-
um in a homogenous population.
Proposition 1. Consider a homogenous population. An equilibrium ex-
ists and is unique.
All proofs are presented in the on-line appendix.We brieﬂy describe
theways in which interaction and protection shape the payoffs of a sus-
ceptible. The negative externality exerted by unprotected individuals is
governed by the incidence of the disease q —the probability that an in-
dividual with whom an individual interacts happens to be infected.9 A simple way to account for risk aversion would involve subtracting cpi1(1− pi1) to
the RHS of Eq. (6) giving a susceptible's expected payoff, c representing the cost of uncer-
tainty for a susceptible. All results and proofs in this paper apply mutatis mutandis under
this alternative speciﬁcation.We are grateful to a referee for drawing our attention to this
point.
10 Lemma 3 in the online appendix shows that both threshold values are decreasing in ϵ,
the exogenous probability of infection.
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(i) the probability z of meeting another susceptible and (ii) the proba-
bility p that a susceptible is in fact infected.
Since in a homogenous population the incidence faced by all individ-
uals is the same, and payoffs are strictly concave in interaction, then all
susceptibles must in any equilibrium choose the same interaction. Let
here ku denote the interaction of unprotected individuals in a given
equilibrium. Since k maximizes protected individuals' payoffs then,
using (1) where A now refers to the subset of susceptibles, the probabil-
ity z of meeting an unprotected individual is
z ¼ ku 1−Vð Þ
ku 1−Vð Þ þ kV
: ð8Þ
Substituting q= zp in Eq. (3) and solving for p yields
p ¼ ϵ
1− 1−ϵð Þαzku
: ð9Þ
A pair (V, ku) constitutes an interior equilibrium if and only if
protected and unprotected individuals have equal payoffs, and
ku ¼ argmax
k
r kð Þ þ 1−ϵð Þ 1−αzpkð Þr k
 h i
ð10Þ
with z and p satisfying, respectively, Eqs. (8) and (9).
The proof of the Proposition has two steps. We ﬁrst consider the
pure interaction game given a ﬁxed protection rate V — this is a
game played among unprotected individuals choosing how much
to interact when the remaining fraction V of the population protects.
We show that this is a game of strategic substitutes, with a unique
equilibrium. The ‘equilibrium’ payoffs attained in the pure interac-
tion game are strictly increasing and continuous in the protection
rate V. As payoffs from protection are ﬁxed, existence and unique-
ness of equilibrium in the overall game of protection and interaction
follows.
The dual response to infection (restricted interaction and protec-
tion) plays a central role in our model. To illustrate its role, we now
compare our equilibrium (a) with equilibrium in the ‘pure protec-
tion’model with interaction ﬁxed exogenously at the no-disease op-
timum k (benchmark 1) and (b) with equilibrium in the ‘pure
interaction’ model with no protection (benchmark 2). We consider
here the contrast between our model and benchmark model 1; the
contrast with benchmark model 2 is developed after the statement
of Proposition 3 below.
An important insight from the economic study of epidemiology is
that a part of the beneﬁts from protection comes from the reduced
risk of infecting others, which agents fail to internalize. In our
model, choosing protection creates an additional externality com-
pared to the benchmark model 1: protected individuals interact
more and this alters the pool of contacts. This remark suggests that
the scope for policy intervention may be greater when individuals
can adapt social interaction, as compared to the ‘pure protection’
benchmark. Our next result illustrates this point in two ways. First,
we show that public protection programs may prove superﬂuous in
benchmark 1, and yet be socially desirable in our framework of adap-
tive interaction. Second, we show that adaptive interaction ultimate-
ly induces higher rates of infection.
Proposition 2. Consider a homogenous population. Let (V *, I*) and
(V1, I1) denote the equilibrium protection and infection rates in our
model and benchmark model 1, respectively. Then:
1. V* ≤ V1, with strict inequality if V* and V1 ∈ (0, 1).
2. V* and V1 ∈ (0, 1)⇒ I* N I1.
The proof of the ﬁrst part builds on the observation that, for any
given rate of protection, the resulting incidence of the disease ishigher with ﬁxed interaction as compared to the case where unpro-
tected individuals adapt (and hence lower) interaction. This pushes
the returns from protection upwards, inducing higher protection
rates. The second part is more delicate: protection is higher in the
benchmark model, but adaptive interaction in our model may com-
pensate for the difference in protection rates. Our proof shows that
while interaction adapts downward, it does so ‘insufﬁciently’. As a
result, incidence and infection are both higher in our model, as com-
pared to the benchmark model 1.
Consider next the implications of increasing returns from interac-
tion. In what follows V(θ) denotes the equilibrium protection rate in a
homogeneous population with type θ.
Proposition 3. Suppose V(θ) ∈ (0, 1). An increase in the returns θ in-
duces a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance shift in the equilibrium proﬁle
of interaction and raises equilibrium protection. Moreover, depending
on the function g, increasing θmay reduce equilibrium infection rates.
The intuition behind theﬁrst part of Proposition 3 is straightforward.
Higher returns from interaction enhance the appeal of protection rela-
tive to the option of reducing interaction. In equilibrium, more agents
protect. This lowers the incidence q of the disease, allowing in turn sus-
ceptibles to interact more.
The second part of the Proposition is perhaps most interesting.
Increased protection tends to lower infection; yet higher interaction
from the susceptible part of the population pushes infection up.
This raises the question: how is infection globally affected by in-
creased returns from interaction? The key issue is the elasticity of
interaction: if this elasticity is not too high, then the effect of higher
protection will prevail. We show in the proof, using an example
with logarithmic returns, that infection rates may fall with a rise
in θ.
The latter observations are helpful in bringing out the differences be-
tween our model and the ‘pure interaction’ benchmark model 2. In the
absence of protection, themore individuals value interaction, the great-
er the negative equilibrium externality each agent imposes on others. In
the ‘pure interaction’ benchmark, therefore, an increase in θ unambigu-
ously raises the infection rate (Kremer, 1996). As shown in the discus-
sion above, in our model the effects of increasing returns θ are very
different. The more individuals value interaction, the less inclined they
are to respond to an epidemic by reducing interaction: this pushes pro-
tection up and leads to falling infection rates for a broad class of
applications.
We turn ﬁnally to the effects of contagiousness on behavior and in-
fection rates. Our analysis establishes that there are two phases in the
equilibrium response to contagiousness. In phase I, at low α, the re-
sponse to higher contagiousness is entirely through reduced interaction.
In phase II, at high α, greater contagiousness induces more protection
but there is no reduction of social interaction. Social interaction among
the unprotected stays constant, but because more individuals protect
(and protected individuals interact more) the proﬁle of interaction un-
dergoes a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance shift. Hence, somewhat sur-
prisingly, social interaction is non-monotonic in contagiousness: it ﬁrst
decreases but eventually rises.
Proposition 4. Consider a homogenous population. Equilibrium pro-
tection V increases with contagiousness α. Moreover, there exist α
and α, α≤α, such that10:
1. If α≤α then a reduction in α induces a ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance shift in the equilibrium proﬁle of interaction. Infec-
tion rate changes depend on the elasticity of interaction with re-
spect to α.
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dominance shift in the equilibrium proﬁle of interaction, and a
decrease of the infection rate I.
3. If α≥α then all agents protect, and I = 0.
We start by observing that if V = 0 then the negative externality
exerted by unprotected individuals is strictly increasing in conta-
giousness, α. This implies that the equilibrium interaction of unpro-
tected individuals, ku, decreases in α and completes the arguments
for part 1.
Consider next an interior equilibrium: an individual must be in-
different between protecting or not. Since payoffs to those with protec-
tion (viz. (7)) are unaffected by α, the payoffs earned by susceptibles
(viz. (6)) must be unchanged as well. This implies that the equilibrium
externality αq(α) is constant in α. As α is rising, the incidence q(.) must
be falling. Now consider protection. Suppose that protection were
falling in α. Then the only way to reduce the incidence q(α) would be
to reduce the interaction ku. But we have already proven that the exter-
nality αq(α) is constant in α, and so is ku. This contradiction establishes
that protection rates must be increasing in α. As the equilibrium ku is
constant in α, and the fraction of protected individuals rises, an increase
in contagiousness α thus induces a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
shift in the equilibrium proﬁle of interaction. This completes the argu-
ment for part 2.
We conclude with a brief discussion on the effect of contagiousness
on infection rates. Kremer (1996) observes that (in the absence of pro-
tection) higher contagiousness may lead to lower infection rates if the
elasticity of interaction with respect to contagiousness is greater than
one. The remark on infection rates in the ﬁrst part of Proposition 4 fol-
lows similar logic. The contrast is, however, sharp if we look at infection
rates in an interior equilibrium (i.e. α∈ α ;αð Þ): in this case higher
contagiousness always lowers infection rates. The idea is as follows.
The externality αq(α) remains constant over this range. The probability
of infection of an unprotected individual must therefore remain
unchanged as well. But I = (1− V)p, so the infection rate I falls, since
equilibrium V is rising in α.
Fig. 1 illustrates these points. Contagiousness α is on the x-axis. We
measure on the y-axis the equilibrium average interaction in the popu-
lation, the equilibrium vaccination rate V, and the equilibrium interac-
tion of unprotected agents ku. The parameter k is the optimal
interaction without contagion.Fig. 1. Responses to Contagiousness.4. Heterogenous populations
This section studies the effect of population heterogeneity on behav-
ior and infection rates. We model heterogeneity in terms of differences
in returns from interaction. Our goal is to examine the interplay be-
tween this heterogeneity and the choice between restricted interaction
and protection. Observe that the casewhere the different ‘types’ of indi-
viduals are completely segregated is covered by Proposition 3 above.
Our analysis reveals that the integration level between different types
has powerful effects on behavior and infection rates.
We shall suppose that a heterogenous population consists of two
equal size communities of individuals with types θH and θL respectively,
θH N θL. A parameterβmeasures integration between the two communi-
ties. With probability β (resp., 1 − β), social interaction takes place
across communities (resp., within one's own community). Thus, for
β= 0 the two communities of individuals are completely segregated,
while for β= 1 all interaction takes place across communities.11 The
probability that a new meeting of an individual in community J is with
an individual in subset A ⊂ J′ is thus
ℙ i∈ J selects contact in A⊂ J0
  ¼ 1−βð ÞI J¼ J0f g þ βI J≠ J0f g
 
Z
i∈A
kidiZ
i∈ J0
kidi;
where as usual I{.} denotes an indicator variable.
We ﬁrst study the effects from integrating communities moderately.
We then explore, through an example, themultiplicity of equilibria aris-
ingwhenmost interaction takes place across communities. Throughout,
we focus the analysis on the more interesting case where the equilibri-
um protection rate in a homogenous population with type θJ is interior,
i.e. V(θJ) ∈ (0, 1) and J ∈ {H, L}.12
Consider ﬁrst β = 0. When β = 0, results from Proposition 3,
concerning homogenous populations, apply. Equilibrium is unique and
entails strictly higher incidence in community L than in community H.
So consider now a small increase in β. Other things equal, an individual
in communityH faces higher incidence compared to β=0, since hewill
interact with some probability with an individual from community L
where the incidence is higher. This raises incentives to protect in com-
munity H. By symmetry, an individual in community L now faces
lower incidence since he will interact, with some probability, with an
individual in communityHwhere the incidence is lower. This lowers in-
centives to protect in community L. Integrating communities moderate-
ly therefore beneﬁts L types: As integration grows, the burden of
protection tends to fall on H types, while L types free-ride. The next
proposition summarizes these insights, and explores their implications
for interaction and infection in the two communities.
Proposition 5. Consider a heterogenous population such that equilibri-
um is interior in both isolated communities, so that V(θJ) ∈ (0, 1),
J ∈ {H, L}. Then an equilibrium exists for all levels of integration β, and
is unique over a range 0;β
 
, where β∈ 0;1=2ð Þ. Moreover, over this
range, increasing β induces (i) higher (lower) protection in community
H (in community L), (ii) lower (higher) infection in community H (in
community L) and (iii) a (inverse) ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance11 For consistency, and to abstract from issues regarding community size, we assume
that if interaction in community J is greater than it is in community J′ then only a fraction
of individuals in community J interact across communities. This ensures in a simple way
that total interaction from community J to J′ equals total interaction from J′ to J. Formally,
if∫
i∈ J kidiN∫i∈ J0 kidi thenpartition community J as J1∪ J2 such that∫i∈ J1kidi ¼ ∫i∈ J0 kidi, and
individuals in J2 interact within J2 only.
12 The analysis of the other cases is similar, but the results are plainer. For instance if
V(θH) = V(θL) = 0 then for any β, equilibrium is unique and entails all individuals in both
communities remaining unprotected. Similarly, if V(θH) = V(θL) = 1 then for any β, equi-
librium is unique and entails all individuals in both communities protecting.
69S. Goyal, A. Vigier / Journal of Public Economics 125 (2015) 64–69shift in the equilibrium proﬁle of interaction of community H (commu-
nity L).
We explained part (i) above.We now develop the intuition underly-
ing parts (ii) and (iii). By continuity, for low values of β the unique equi-
librium is interior in both communities. So, for small values of β,
individuals in each community must remain indifferent between pro-
tection and no protection. Equilibrium payoffs of unprotected individ-
uals therefore remain unchanged as β varies, given that payoffs of
protected individuals are constant. Since payoffs of unprotected individ-
uals are strictly falling in the incidence of the disease, this implies that
the incidence faced by individuals in both communities must remain
unaffected by changes inβ. This in turn implies that, in each community,
susceptible interaction must be unchanged, and so must their probabil-
ity of infection. However, since the protection rate grows (falls) inH (L),
the fraction of infected individuals must in fact decrease (increase) in
communityH (L). Finally, the arguments above establish thatmore inte-
gration induces higher protection in community H but no reduction of
interaction by unprotected individuals in that community. Hence, an
increase in β induces a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance shift in the
equilibrium proﬁle of interaction of community H. Similar reasoning
establishes the claim for community L.
There are interesting implications of Proposition 5. To illustrate, sup-
pose that prior to the stage atwhich individualsmake a decision a social
planner is able to allocate protection to a small subset of the population.
If communities are largely segregated (β small), the unique equilibrium
is interior in both communities. Any allocation of the social planner
therefore induces complete crowding-out of private incentives, leaving
the resulting equilibrium unaffected. Suppose, on the other hand, that
communities are sufﬁciently integrated so that in the unique equilibri-
um all individuals in community H protect while all individuals in com-
munity L remain unprotected. In this case, allocating protection to high
types once again crowds-out private incentives, whereas allocating
protection to low types strictly improves welfare in the resulting equi-
librium, due to the positive externalities from protection within com-
munity L. More generally, targeting individuals valuing interaction
least tends to minimize crowding-out in our model and as such, some-
what counter-intuitively, makes it attractive for public policy to protect
individuals valuing social interaction least.
We have so far focused on the case of limited integration between
communities. Greater integration typically implies multiple equilibria.
To bring out this point in the simplest way, we next consider an exam-
ple where β= 1 and focus on a range of parameters where isolated
communities exhibit interior equilibria. The case β= 1 corresponds,
e.g., to a situation where all sex is heterosexual. We show in the exam-
ple that three equilibria exist. The ﬁrst equilibrium is interior in both
communities. The other two equilibria are extremal: all individuals pro-
tect in one of the two communities, while all individuals remain unpro-
tected in the other. In these equilibria, a protected individual interacts
only with unprotected individuals, and vice versa. Protection is thus at-
tractive for those who do protect, while remaining unprotected is opti-
mal under the guarantee never to meet an infected individual. In this
setting, it is possible to show that social welfare is highest in the corner
equilibriumwhereH types protect and L types do not. Extremal equilib-
ria are attractive since they maximize meetings between protected and
unprotected individuals. Of the two extremal equilibria, that in which
high types protect dominates due to the fact that the loss from reduced
interaction is worse for high types than low.
Proposition 6. Consider a heterogenous population, β = 1, and
q(θJ)∈ (0, ε), J∈ {H, L}. There exist exactly three equilibria. In equilibri-
um 1 all individuals in groupsH protect and all individuals in group L re-
main unprotected. In equilibrium2 all individuals in group L protect and
all individuals in group H remain unprotected. Equilibrium 3 is interior
in both groups. IfWk denotes average social welfare in these equilibria
thenW1 N W2 N W3.5. Conclusion
Social and economic interactions generate rewards but also facilitate
the spread of infections. Individuals can respond to this risk by
restricting interaction and by investing in protection. This paper de-
velops a model that examines the trade-off between these two actions
and the implications for the prevalence of infections.
We study a setting in which an infection may be contracted either
exogenously or through contact with an infected individual. Individuals
decide on how much to interact with others and whether to protect
themselves. We study the equilibrium levels of protection and interac-
tion and the population rate of infection.
We establish that there exists a unique equilibrium. We then derive
a number of interesting implications of the co-determination of interac-
tion and protection. There is a threshold property with regard to the ef-
fects of contagiousness. Below a threshold level, interaction falls in
contagiousness, while it rises above the threshold. Infection rates too
maymove non-monotonically: below a threshold level they rise in con-
tagiousness and above the threshold they fall with contagiousness.
In the basic model, all individuals are homogenous. We extend the
model to study a society composed of two communities that differ in
their returns from interaction – High and Low. Individuals in isolated
communities exhibit different behavior: the High community has a
higher rate of protection and interaction. As communities integrate,
protection and interaction further increase in the High community
while they fall in the Low community. Integration thus leads to lower
(higher) disease prevalence in the High (Low) community.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.02.010.
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